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ARTICLES
COVID-19 AND ENERGY JUSTICE: UTILITY BILL
RELIEF IN VIRGINIA
Joel B. Eisen 
ABSTRACT
Energy justice has captured national attention as scholars have
spotlighted inequities in energy production and distribution activities, energy and utility regulation, and the clean energy transition.
Within this broader context, this Article reflects on the successes
and setbacks for the movement toward energy justice through a case
study focusing on legislative, executive, and regulatory attempts between 2020 and 2022 to provide relief for Virginia utility customers
harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Article begins by defining
the problem of energy insecurity and demonstrating that the pandemic exacerbated existing energy insecurity for vulnerable citizens
of Virginia. It then traces the efforts over this two-year period of the
General Assembly, Governor Northam and the Virginia State Corporation Commission to address the challenge, through temporary
moratoria on utility bill payments and other means, including proposals to provide direct relief to utility customers and more sweeping proposals to reform Virginia’s public utility law to comprehensively address energy insecurity concerns. Ultimately, even though
only modest relief was made available, advocates could also claim
success with the enactment of a new state law that adopted and subsequently modified a new Percentage of Income Payment Program
that is to be further refined and implemented by agency actions.

Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Many thanks to Sanya
Carley, Shalanda Baker, Shelley Welton, Mary Finley-Brook, and others for their pioneering work on energy justice that informs this Article. Thanks also to Alexis Laundry and
Caroline Jaques for research assistance.
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Looking more broadly at these actions, one may draw encouragement from the fact that issues of energy insecurity have featured
more prominently than ever before in Virginia’s energy policymaking discussions and that activists at all levels have created advocacy networks that may prove durable in the long run. Still, the Article concludes, much more remains to be done to address energy
justice during the upcoming multi-decade clean energy transition
put in motion by the Virginia Clean Economy Act.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the intersection of public utility law in
Virginia and energy insecurity concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic within the broader context of “energy justice.” It focuses on
the efforts during General Assembly sessions in 2020 and 2021 and
in state agencies in 2021 and 2022 (and beyond, as required by a
new law) directed specifically to providing relief for Virginia utility
customers who find themselves unable to pay their bills as a result
of the pandemic and ongoing energy insecurity.
A 2019 article by Professor Shelley Welton and the author of this
Article developed a wide-ranging agenda for advancing energy justice, summarizing and framing advocates’ many different goals.1
One common objective is increased attention to the economic hardships associated with unaffordable utility bills, which scholars call
“energy insecurity” (or energy poverty). Energy insecurity is generally defined as challenges to affordability that lower income people and people of color face through increasing energy prices and a
high energy burden, which is the inability to adequately meet basic
household energy needs.2 This can result in loss of access to energy,
which is a central need in modern society, and other negative consequences (difficulties obtaining credit, for example).3
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated energy insecurity and redoubled the need to address it. Millions throughout the nation either lost their utility service or were in danger of having their service disconnected, due to the pandemic’s economic fallout in which
many lost their jobs or experienced reduced income. Virginia, like
many other states, established a disconnection moratorium to prevent utilities from shutting off service. By August, it had been
nearly six months after the pandemic had fully sprung on the

1. Shelley Welton & Joel B. Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging
Agenda, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 307, 308, 310–12, 320–21, 346, 350, 364 (2019).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part I. Besides the types of reforms described in this Article, scholars have
called for attention to energy insecurity throughout the process of developing new clean
energy programs. For example, they call for ensuring that clean energy programs such as
net metering do not increase rates for lower-income ratepayers who do not participate in
them. Scholars have also advocated for procedural reforms to ensure that those who have
previously not had an opportunity to participate in byzantine legislative and administrative
agency processes could do so, and thereby have a voice in clean energy’s future. See generally
Welton & Eisen, supra note 1, at 353–54.
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American landscape. However, state regulators did not extend the
state’s moratorium beyond the fall of 2020. Thus, Virginia’s legislators were well aware of the need to provide relief to those most
severely affected by the pandemic. A wide-ranging special session
resulted in language being added to the state’s budget law that
helped some of those most at risk for energy insecurity after the
state’s disconnection moratorium ended,4 although more ambitious
proposals failed to become law.
Throughout 2021 and into 2022, service losses and disruption
remained a concern for vulnerable populations. In Virginia, there
have been other efforts to create bill relief, notably the enactment,
refinement, and forthcoming implementation of the Percentage of
Income Payment Program (“PIPP”).5 This program, modeled after
those in other states, was first enacted in the Virginia Clean Economy Act (“VCEA”), the landmark 2020 law which committed Virginia to a sweeping clean energy transition. It was later amended
and expanded in the 2021 legislative session.6 The PIPP limits the
percentage of utility bills paid by qualifying low-income consumers
to six percent or ten percent of their annual household income, depending on their household heating source, with the shortfall being
made up through imposition of a universal service fee paid by all
utility customers that creates a fund to support the PIPP. The
VCEA tasked the Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation
Commission (“SCC”), the state’s public utility regulator, with the
details of administering the program. The amended VCEA expanded eligibility criteria and, in addition to SCC responsibilities,
assigned the Virginia Department of Social Services (“DSS”) in
consultation with the Department of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) to establish rules and guidelines for adoption,
implementation, and general administration of the program and
the fund created through the universal service fee. As of mid-2022,
the rulemaking effort had not yet been completed.7
After discussing the concept of energy justice and its relevance
to developments in Virginia public utility law and policy, the Article concludes that these efforts to alleviate lower-income
4. The special session was called for a variety of reasons, including the need to provide
other forms of COVID-19 relief, to address criminal justice concerns, and to revisit the
state’s recently adopted budget, due to projected declining revenues. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.
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Virginians’ energy burden have been partially successful, but by
no means completely so. Virginia’s utility law remains skewed in
favor of the state’s large utilities and against the interests of lowerincome consumers. All is not lost, however, as legislative and administrative agency work has led to partial relief from crushing
utility bills and featured continued coalition building among advocacy groups. Poverty law advocates, advocates for utility reform,
and environmental groups have worked together and shaped their
message to fit quickly-changing events. While there is more work
to do, their efforts have built a solid foundation for future work to
advance energy justice concerns. Additionally, while it is not a focus of this Article, Virginia’s new environmental justice statute
may further impact the state government’s response to the problem of energy affordability.8
Part I begins the discussion by discussing energy justice and defining energy insecurity, and the scope of the problem in Virginia
and around the nation during the pandemic. It continues with a
discussion of the disconnection moratoria in Virginia and other
states. Part II examines the legislative effort to provide targeted
relief to those most affected by utility bills during the pandemic.
As this Part explains, these legislative proposals proceeded on two
distinctly different tracks. The first included standalone bills and
budgetary amendments that attempted to create repayment plan
structures for those in arrears on their utility bills by streching out
repayments over as long as two years. The second was an attempt
in the special session to correct a long-standing problem in Virginia
utility law: the ability of the state’s largest investor-owned utilities
to reap excess profits and keep overcharges without having to refund them to ratepayers. As Part II explains, legislative proposals
aimed to use refunded overcharges to fund targeted COVID-19 relief. Part III explains how Virginia’s then-Governor, Ralph
Northam, offered his own legislative proposal to do this, and how
the eventual outcome was more modest: the continuation of the
moratorium on disconnections until the end of the pandemic, and
the approval of a repayment plan structure that allows utilities to
offer those in arrears on their bills to stretch repayments out over
two years. Part IV explains the ongoing development of the PIPP.
Part V concludes with observations about energy justice in Virginia
in the aftermath of these events.

8.

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-234 to -235 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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I. ENERGY JUSTICE, ENERGY INSECURITY IN VIRGINIA DURING
THE PANDEMIC, AND THE SCC MORATORIUM ON SERVICE
DISCONNECTION
Many scholars have called for energy law to incorporate concerns of fairness and equity. At the moment, however, energy justice is “nascent” and lacks a comprehensive definition.9 Scholars
are developing a wide-ranging agenda that tackles everything from
diversity and inclusion concerns in employment within the growing clean energy sector, inequities in siting of energy production
facilities,10 procedural concerns in the proceedings of state public
utility commissions (“PUCs”),11 and the energy affordability issues
discussed in this Article.12 University of Richmond professor Mary
Finley-Brook and her co-authors describe a new “critical energy
justice” that “encompasses recognition, environmental, distributive, and procedural justices as transformative sets of inter-relations.”13 Professor Shalanda Baker has stated that, “[i]n order to
facilitate the transition and incentivize clean technology without
replicating the harms of the old system, successor policies must
grapple with the distributive impacts of the existing system and
center the concerns of the poor and people of color in policy design.”14 Accomplishing this is no overnight proposition. This author’s own article with Professor Shelley Welton, who has written
extensively on this subject herself, developed an “emerging
agenda,”15 recognizing that it may be years before substantial progress on clean energy justice is achieved.
In the near term, one consistent focus of energy justice advocates
is on energy insecurity: the disproportionate extent to which energy bills impact lower-income utility customers and people of
9. Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice
within the Energy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2019).
10. Id. at 43; Welton & Eisen, supra note 1, at 308, 357–59, 362; Mary Finley-Brook,
Travis L. Williams, Judi Anne Caron-Sheppard & Mary Kathleen Jaromin, Critical Energy
Justice in US Natural Gas Infrastructuring, 41 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 176, 176, 179–
80, 183 (2019) (discussing energy justice issues in the siting of natural gas pipelines).
11. See Shelley Welton, Decarbonization in Democracy, 67 UCLA L. REV. 56 (2020);
Welton & Eisen, supra note 1; Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 335
(2019).
12. Sanya Carley & David M. Konisky, The Justice and Equity Implications of the Clean
Energy Transition, 5 NATURE ENERGY 569 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-020-06416 [https://perma.cc/4S3U-T5VR].
13. Finley-Brook et al., supra note 10, at 179.
14. Baker, supra note 9, at 30.
15. Welton & Eisen, supra note 1, at 307.
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color, and the adverse economic and health impacts of these bills
and households’ inability to pay them. This Part describes the
problem of energy insecurity and how the pandemic exacerbated
it. It then discusses the nationwide response during the pandemic
through moratoria on disconnections of utility service, explaining
Virginia’s moratorium ordered by the SCC. As that discussion concludes, by the beginning of the special legislative session, it was
apparent that the SCC would not extend the moratorium, leaving
further action for the General Assembly.
A. Energy Insecurity and the Pandemic’s Impact
A basic definition of energy insecurity is “the uncertainty that a
household can pay its energy bills.”16 Researchers have focused on
“energy burden,” or the percentage of gross household income
spent on energy.17 According to the U.S. Department of Energy,
low-income households face an average energy burden of 8.6%,
nearly triple that of other households.18 There are many reasons
for this. For example, lower-income households often live in older
houses that lack insulation and consume more energy, and have
fewer opportunities to access technologies that help make energy
more affordable, such as improving energy efficiency or installing
solar energy systems.19
Energy insecurity in the United States did not start with the
pandemic.20 Data from a 2015 study by the Energy Information
Administration (“EIA”) shows that most U.S. households at or near
the federal poverty line are significantly burdened by energy costs,
with roughly one in three U.S. households struggling to pay their
16. Michelle Graff & Sanya Carley, COVID-19 Assistance Needs to Target Energy
Insecurity, 5 NATURE ENERGY 352, 352 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-020-0620-y
[https://perma.cc/UJS2-WKCD].
17. Low-Income Community Energy Solutions, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF ENERGY
EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/slsc/low-income-commun
ity-energy-solutions [https://perma.cc/A4VF-EAWP].
18. Id.
19. Id.; see generally Carley & Konisky, supra note 12, at 569.
20. Shalanda H. Baker, How To Create Anti-Racist Energy Policies, WBUR
COGNOSCENTI (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2020/09/23/utility-billsenergy-climate-change-covid-environmental-justice-shalanda-h-baker [https://perma.cc/Q3
64-2DLS]; Joseph Daniel, Electricity Shut-Offs in a Pandemic: How COVID-19 Leads to Energy Insecurity, Burdensome Bills, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: THE EQUATION (Apr.
20, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/joseph-daniel/how-covid-19-leads-to-energy-insecurity/ [https://perma.cc/Z326-BB6T] (terming it “like a pre-existing condition for many
Americans”).
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energy bills, and one in five either reducing or eliminating spending on other necessities to pay utility bills.21 Lower-income people
and people of color face these burdens more than others. Households headed by people of color are less likely to be able to pay electric bills than white households.22 A 2021 study by the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory found that lower-income households
have five times more utility service disruptions than higher-income households, and service losses by households of color are “far
more likely” than for households headed by whites.23 Higher energy burdens affect residents most in places where economic conditions were weak even before the pandemic. By one estimate, residents in some Appalachian counties spend as much as thirty
percent of their income on electric bills.24 This can have drastic consequences. As one observer put it, “[i]n this country, without a
basic level of electricity and heating service, your home is uninhabitable . . . [a]nd you’re not able to participate effectively in society
at all.”25
The pandemic exacerbated this situation. As people were asked
or ordered to stay home, there was a dramatic increase in residential energy use and energy bills.26 Millions of Americans lost their
jobs and their ability to pay these bills. By the summer of 2020, a
21. Chip Berry, Carolyn Hronis & Maggie Woodward, One in Three U.S. Households
Faces a Challenge in Meeting Energy Needs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37072
[https://perma.cc/DTQ8-KH5U]
(discussing findings of the EIA’s 2015 Residential Energy Consumption Survey).
22. Megan Leonhardt, Nearly 35 Million Households will Lose their Utility Shutoff Protections Over the Next Month, CNBC (Aug. 27, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/08/27/millions-of-households-will-lose-their-utility-shutoff-protections-in-the-next-mo
nth.html [https://perma.cc/8ZW8-X43K] (citing John Howat, senior energy analyst at the
National Consumer Law Center).
23. CHANDRA FARLEY ET AL., GRID MODERNIZATION LAB’Y CONSORTIUM, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, FUTURE ELEC. UTIL. REGUL. REP. NO. 12, ADVANCING EQUITY IN UTILITY
REGULATION 20–21 (Lisa Schwartz ed., 2021), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/
files/feur_12_-_advancing_equity_in_utility_regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y252-UYK3];
Herman K. Trabish, Utility Regulators Eye New Tools to Ensure Equity Efforts Don’t Impinge on Other Policy Goals, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/utility-regulators-eye-new-tools-to-ensure-equity-efforts-dont-impinge-on/618384/
[https://perma.cc/9RED-CZ3K] (citing the report and discussing utility programs aimed at
increasing equity).
24. Daniel, supra note 20.
25. Rachel M. Cohen, Organizers Push For Stronger COVID-19 Utility Shut-off Protections As Winter Nears, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 22, 2020, 1:57 PM), https://theintercept.
com/2020/10/22/covid-utility-shut-off-moratorium/ [https://perma.cc/Z7LV-3MWF] (quoting
John Howat, senior energy analyst at the National Consumer Law Center).
26. Joel B. Eisen, COVID-19’s Impact on Renewable Energy Development, 69 KAN. L.
REV. 775, 786–87 (2021) (discussing EIA data showing higher residential use, but lower
commercial and industrial use of electricity during the pandemic).
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survey conducted by Professors Sanya Carley and David Konisky
of Indiana University found that “13% of respondents had been unable to pay an energy bill during the prior month, 9% had received
an electricity utility shutoff notice and 4% had had their electric
utility service disconnected.”27 By September, when Professors
Carley and Konisky reported updated findings, each of these figures had approximately doubled. Through extrapolation, this
meant that as many as “3.8 million Americans could not pay an
energy bill in at least one month since May, 2.8 million received a
shutoff notice, and 1.2 million had their electricity disconnected.”28
During the pandemic, when so many work, school, and recreational
activities centered on the home, utility shut-offs could be disastrous; they could “prevent children from participating in virtual
learning, make it difficult for adults to find jobs, and make it even
harder to keep hands clean and take showers.”29
As one assessment put it, the combination of the pandemic and
increasing energy insecurity was an “insidious crisis.”30 According
to the DSS, nearly 450,000 low-income households in Virginia
qualified for state energy assistance programs in 2019.31 As the
pandemic continued on, the SCC staff conducted a preliminary survey, estimating that as of July 1, Virginians owed more than $184
million in past-due utility bills.32 A letter sent by a coalition of
groups to the members of the General Assembly in August described the situation quite starkly. In its letter, the coalition
stated:
27. Sanya Carley & David Konisky, Energy Is a Basic Need, and Many Americans are
Struggling to Afford it in the COVID-19 Recession, THE CONVERSATION (July 30, 2020, 8:19
AM), https://theconversation.com/energy-is-a-basic-need-and-many-americans-are-struggl
ing-to-afford-it-in-the-covid-19-recession-140416 [https://perma.cc/YC9H-2VDQ] .
28. ENV’T RESILIENCE INST., Survey of Household Energy Insecurity in Time of COVID,
Preliminary Results of Wave-2, and Wave-1 and Wave-2 Combined, IND. UNIV. 1 (Sept. 22,
2020), https://eri.iu.edu/documents/09232020-wave-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/USD9-9WUC].
29. Cohen, supra note 25.
30. Michelle Graff & Trevor Memmott, Coronavirus is Creating a Crisis of Energy Insecurity, ENV’T HEALTH NEWS (July 1, 2020), https://www.ehn.org/coronavirus-and-en ergy2646296578/particle-7 [https://perma.cc/MA9H-EMHD] (citing ENV’T RESILIENCE INST.,
SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD ENERGY INSECURITY IN TIME OF COVID, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF
WAVE-1, IND. UNIV. 1 (June 10, 2020), https://oneill.indiana.edu/doc/research/ energyinsecurity-survey-june-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/USD9-9WUC]).
31. Press Release, Appalachian Voices, Va Should Expand Utility Shutoff Ban During
Covid-19 Crisis (June 5, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://appvoices.org/2020/06/05/va-should-expandutility-shutoff-ban-during-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/MMP3-5CRM].
32. Letter from Kimberly B. Pate, Div. of Util. Accy. & Fin. Dir., Va. State Corp.
Comm’n, to Sen. L. Louise Lucas & Del. Eileen Filler-Corn, Va. Gen. Assemb. 2 (Aug. 14,
2020) (on file with author).
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The objective of the 2020 special session of the General Assembly is to
provide immediate relief and long-term recovery solutions for Virginians struggling under the weight of combined economic and public
health crises. Virginians—particularly Black and Brown communities—were already facing rising electricity bills before the COVID-19
crisis and economic fallout. Now they face mounting debt from unpaid
electricity bills when disconnection moratoriums end.33

B. Disconnection Moratoria and the Virginia SCC’s Actions
As noted above, a common form of assistance during the early
stage of the pandemic was freezes (moratoria) on disconnection of
service for non-payment of utility bills.34 These were mostly imposed by state PUCs under their statutory authorities to address
energy insecurity.35 PUCs are states’ utility regulators. They typically have powers of “capping bills, waiving late payment fees, automating payment plans or [adopting] other protective
measures.”36 A resolution adopted by the National Association of
State Utility Consumer Advocates in May listed other possible
PUC actions, such as communicating with customers about low income bill payment assistance from state and federal programs, and
publicizing weatherization or other energy efficiency programs.37
Beyond the scope of this Article, but important as well, are actions
by PUCs to establish clean energy programs that can help protect
consumers affected by energy insecurity.38

33. See Letter from 350 Fairfax et al. to Members of Va. Gen. Assembly (Aug. 24, 2020),
http://www.vcnva.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/HB-5088_-Coalition-Sign-on-Letter-resi
gned.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XHK-9R73] (urging support for House Bill 5088, which would
steer funds from Dominion’s overcharges for utility bill relief); see infra Part II.
34. Map of Disconnection Moratoria, NAT’L ASS’N REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, https://www.
naruc.org/compilation-of-covid-19-news-resources/map-of-disconnection-moratoria/ [https://
perma.cc/YP9W-VU9E] (last updated Sept. 9, 2021).
35. Deron Lovaas, Public Utility Commissions: Swiss Army Knives of Protection, NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/deron-lova
as/public-utility-commissions-swiss-army-knives-protection
[https://perma.cc/H94Q-W9
MG].
36. Daniel, supra note 20.
37. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE UTIL. CONS. ADVOCATES, RES. 2020-01, NASUCA RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE EFFECTS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC CRISES
RESULTING FROM COVID-19 UPON UTILITY RATES AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO CONSUMERS
BY PUBLIC UTILITIES (May 12, 2020), https://nasuca.org/wp-content/uploads/ 20 20/05/202001-NASUCA-COVID-19-Policy-Resolution-Final-5-12-20-.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN2E-9U
54].
38. Daniel, supra note 20; see generally Welton & Eisen, supra note 1; Baker, supra
note 9.
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By the summer, a majority of states had established disconnection moratoria, mostly by PUC action, although some states used
executive orders and legislation.39 Protections ranged from full
moratoriums to more narrow protections.40 Some states only protected those customers who could demonstrate that the pandemic
had directly affected them, while others protected all customers
who were behind on their utility bills.41 By August, many moratoria were set to expire, and with the pandemic’s second wave predicted to arrive, millions of utility customers faced a loss of service.42 The Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency
Solutions Act (“HEROES Act”), the COVID relief bill that passed
the U.S. House of Representatives in May, included a provision establishing a national ban on utility disconnections, but that bill did
not advance in the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate.43
Preventing shutoffs was important to avoid the most tragic results, but hardly sufficient to reduce the added economic pressure
on lower-income families from unpaid energy bills. A shut-off moratorium stops immediate loss of essential utility service, but does
not address pervasive economic hardship.44 Most states did not
couple their moratoria with plans to tackle the serious and growing
problem of customer indebtedness to utilities during the pandemic.45 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(“CARES Act”) provided $900 million through supplemental funding for the existing federal program that offers assistance for
lower-income utility customers, but “this only scratche[d] the surface of what [was] needed.”46 Even with half the states having moratoria in place, one study estimated that by the summer as many
as 800,000 lower-income households might already have been disconnected.47

39. NAT’L ASS’N REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, supra note 34.
40. Id.
41. Id.; Daniel, supra note 20.
42. Leonhardt, supra note 22.
43. H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. § 190701 (2020).
44. Taylor Moore, Utility Bill Deferments are Ending. Here’s a State-by-State List of
Programs That Can Help, NEXTADVISOR (Aug. 30, 2021), https://time.com/nextadvisor/inthe-news/utility-bill-deferment-ending/ [https://perma.cc/S87Z-4CH2].
45. Ariel Drehobl, A Perfect Storm? COVID-19 Cuts Incomes and Hikes Home Energy
Bills, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (May 15, 2020), https://www.aceee.org
/blog-post/2020/05/perfect-storm-covid-19-cuts-incomes-and-hikes-home-energy-bills [https:
//perma.cc/6E66-ZNVV].
46. Carley & Konisky, supra note 27.
47. Id.
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The SCC established Virginia’s disconnection moratorium. On
March 16, 2020, the SCC ordered an immediate moratorium on
service disconnections for sixty days, through May 15, for non-payment caused by the pandemic for electric utilities and other utilities over which it has jurisdiction.48 On April 9, the SCC ordered a
thirty-day extension to June 15.49 In this order, it warned for the
first time that a moratorium could not be extended indefinitely
without the prospect of financial risk to the state’s utilities, and
without some costs of non-payment being shifted to other customers of utilities if unpaid bills were never paid.50 On May 26, it
sought comment on whether to extend the moratorium further.51
The SCC subsequently issued orders on June 12 and August 24,
extending the moratorium through September 15, stating in August that it intended “to provide an opportunity for the General
Assembly to choose whether to address legislatively the effects of
the COVID-19 crisis on utility customers and utilities” during the
special session.52
As the special session began, the SCC extended the moratorium
to October 5, at Governor Northam’s request, to allow the General
Assembly more time to complete its work.53 It was readily apparent
that more relief would be necessary. The August SCC staff report
noted that as of June 30, past due amounts owed by customers during the pandemic totaled $116.6 million for Dominion Energy
alone.54 Yet after extending the moratorium for a total of six
months, the SCC was done. It stated:
Since we first imposed the moratorium on March 16, 2020, we have
warned repeatedly that this moratorium is not sustainable indefinitely. The mounting costs of unpaid bills must eventually be paid,

48. Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., PUR-2020-00048, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 785, at *1
(Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Mar. 16, 2020) (order suspending disconnection
of service and suspending tariff provisions regarding utility disconnections of service).
49. See Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., PUR-2020-00048, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 762, at
*5 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 9, 2020) (order extending suspensions
of service disconnections).
50. Id. at *2–3.
51. See Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., PUR-2020-00048, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 779, at
*3–4 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n May 26, 2020) (order seeking comment on
suspension of service disconnections).
52. Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., PUR-2020-00048, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 1156, at *2–
3 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Aug. 24, 2020) (order on moratorium).
53. Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., PUR-2020-00048, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 1158, at *1
(Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n, Sept. 15, 2020) (additional order on moratorum).
54. Letter from Kimberly B. Pate, supra note 32, at 2.
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either by the customers in arrears or by other customers who themselves may be struggling to pay their bills. Unless the General Assembly explicitly directs that a utility’s own shareholders must bear the
cost of unpaid bills, those costs will almost certainly be shifted to other
paying customers.55

Because no more relief was forthcoming from the SCC, any further action would have to come from the General Assembly. “The
SCC tried to be very clear when they extended the moratorium to
[October] 5 that they would not extend it again. They needed a policy decision,” said Dana Wiggins, Executive Director of the Virginia
Poverty Law Center.56 “There is relief to be had. People deserve it
now, especially as we’re about to head into the colder months.”57
II. THE SPECIAL SESSION AND PROPOSALS FOR TARGETED RELIEF
FOR UTILITY BILLS
The looming end of the disconnection moratorium shifted responsibility to the General Assembly. The legislature convened for
a special session in August 2020 to address the state’s growing financial challenges as a result of the pandemic and to tackle a
broader agenda, particularly as the nation was galvanized during
the summer by protests and calls for criminal justice reform.58 During this special session, legislators proposed solutions to help those
who were at risk of being disconnected from their utilities during
the pandemic due to economic hardship. The legislative efforts
moved forward on multiple tracks. In the budget process itself,
members of the House and Senate proposed amendments to address bill relief. In addition, standalone legislation was proposed
to provide targeted relief for utility consumers during the pandemic. This legislation took two basic forms: proposals to create
extended debt repayment plans, and proposals to use overcharges
by Dominion Energy for a combination of direct refunds and debt
55. Temp. Suspension Tariff Req., 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 1158, at *2.
56. Mel Leonor, SCC Won’t Extend Moratorium on Utility Disconnections; Lawmakers
Split on Plans for Relief, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 1, 2020), https://richmond.com/news
/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/scc-wont-extend-moratorium-on-utility-disconnections
-lawmakers-split-on-plans-for-relief/article_e4fef752-a99d-55e1-ba09-2664fad060df.html
[https://perma.cc/DZ33-8RU2].
57. Id.
58. Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, Lawmakers Return to Richmond with
High-Stakes Agenda of Coronavirus, Criminal Justice Issues, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2020,
2:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/lawmakers-return-to-rich
mond-with-high-stakes-agenda-of-covid-criminal-justice-issues/2020/08/17/2625391a-dd9211ea-809e-b8be57ba616e_story.html [https://perma.cc/82FY-C7KZ].

EISEN-MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

168

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/23/2022 10:46 AM

[Vol. 57:155

forgiveness. Eventually, Governor Northam weighed in with his
own proposal for budget language, as described in Part III.
A. The Special Session
Virginia’s General Assembly is a part-time legislature that normally meets for sixty days in January through March in even-numbered years, and thirty days in odd years.59 The 2020 regular session convened on January 8 and adjourned on March 12. Using his
authority under state law,60 Governor Northam called a special
session which convened on August 18, 2020.61 The session intended
to address a projected deficit of $2.7 billion in the state’s budget
due to lower projected revenues during the pandemic.62 Even
though the General Assembly had just approved the state’s next
two-year budget,63 the stark realities of the stay-at-home orders
and reduced economic activity brought on by the pandemic meant
revisions would be necessary to deal with an anticipated shortfall
in state revenues. Northam acted on this in April by ordering a
freeze on billions of dollars in new discretionary spending.64
The General Assembly’s Democratic leadership developed a
wide-ranging agenda for the special session. That agenda included:
dealing with the budget shortfall; and considering high-profile legislation on criminal justice reform after the unrest, nationwide,
and the demonstrations in Richmond—sparked by the killing of
George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020—captured national
attention.65 Legislators eventually tackled proposals to address
59. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
60. Id.
61. Hannah Eason, Northam: Virginia General Assembly to Hold August Special Session, NBC12 (July 19, 2020, 5:09 PM), https://www.nbc12.com/2020/07/19/northam-virginiageneral-assembly-holds-august-special-session/ [https://perma.cc/PR26-W94Q].
62. Schneider & Vozzella, supra note 58.
63. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1289.
64. Michael Martz, Governor to Call ‘Timeout’ on Budget, Suspend All New Spending,
Use Cash for Essential Services, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 6, 2020), https://richmond.com
/news/virginia/governor-to-call-timeout-on-budget-suspend-all-new-spending-use-cash-foressential-services/article_8c606f58-eacc-5517-96ea-8718e6f748ba.html [https://perma.cc/99
X5-C38N].
65. Richmond’s role in the discussion over criminal justice reform attracted worldwide
attention. Zach Joachim, Cover of National Geographic’s ‘The Year in Pictures’ Features Image of Richmond’s Lee Monument, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 9, 2020), https://richmond.
com/news/state-and-regional/cover-of-national-geographics-the-year-in-pictures-featuresimage-of-richmonds-lee-monument/article_b99c848c-b488-54d6-9d26-a917b5141f27.html
[https://perma.cc/GAT7-VUQD] (National Geographic magazine’s year-end review cover features the art that reimagined the Robert E. Lee statue on Richmond’s Monument Avenue).
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these issues and a wide variety of pandemic-related matters.66 In
the end, the special session lasted longer than the regular session.67 Virginia’s final budget was adopted after the Presidential
election in November, in part due to disagreements between Democrats in the House and Senate about how to implement a proposed
state constitutional amendment on the ballot in November to establish a bipartisan Congressional redistricting commission.68 The
expanded agenda and lengthy nature of the special session gave
legislators considerable opportunities to focus on pandemic-related
matters.
As the situation evolved, the state’s revenue situation turned out
not to be quite as dire as forecasted. In August, before the special
session began, Governor Northam proposed a revised budget that
kept most budget freezes while adding back spending on a limited
number of new priorities on matters such as education, rural
broadband internet, and voter protection in the upcoming election.69 Some measures intended to help Virginians suffering because of the pandemic eventually found their way into the final
revised budget. These included a measure aimed at eviction prevention, which the Governor’s August budget proposal had included.70 In the interim, the federal government had acted as well,
steering funds to the states under the CARES Act.71 As a result,
the House and Senate had some limited ability to amend the
budget to spend money on new programs to deal with the

66. See, e.g., Special Session Update, VA. POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 21, 2020), https://vplc.
org/special-session-update/ [https://perma.cc/F98C-3D8K].
67. Gregory S. Schneider, Yes, They’re Still in Session: Virginia Lawmakers Meet, but
No Deal Yet on a State Budget, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2020, 3:46 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virgina-general-assembly-special-session-continues/
2020/10/09/74084ba6-08c4-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_story.html [https://perma.cc/H7LW-7
UBZ].
68. Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, Virginia General Assembly Wraps Up Marathon Session with Votes on Budget, Police Oversight Bills, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2020, 9:22
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-special-session-ending/2020/10/16/940e14c4-0f29-11eb-b1e8-16b59b92b36d_story.html [https://perma.cc/ER6A
-MYF3].
69. Governor Northam Proposes Voter Protection Measures Ahead of November General
Election, VA. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/ne
wsroom/all-releases/2020/august/headline-859958-en.html [https://perma.cc/L39Q-TSW B].
70. COMMONWEALTH OF VA., GEN. ASSEMB., EVICTION MORATORIUM LANGUAGE, Spec.
Sess. I, at 1–3 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
71. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 5001, 134 Stat. 281, 501 (2020) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 801–805) (establishing the Coronavirus Relief Fund for assisting state, local, and tribal governments).
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pandemic, including utility bill relief.72 But these programs would
largely have to use federal funds, which had to be spent under the
CARES Act’s terms by the end of the year, or some other source.73
Legislators would have to be both creative and frugal.
B. Repayment Plan Proposals for Utility Bill Relief
As the special legislative session began, many Virginians were
concerned about worsening energy insecurity and the unequal distribution of this burden on lower-income residents and people of
color. Legislators advanced proposals to address the harm that
would befall many in Virginia after the disconnection moratorium
expired. One standalone legislative effort that attracted considerable attention from a broad range of stakeholders aimed to create
no-interest debt repayment plans for those who could not pay their
utility bills. Senator Jennifer McClellan, a high-profile member of
the Senate who had previously announced that she would be a candidate for Governor,74 introduced Senate Bill 5118 in August.75
This bill aimed to offer consumers the ability to repay arrearages
through an “Emergency Debt Repayment Plan” that would allow
them to spread repayments out for up to twenty-four months with
no penalties, late fees, finance charges, or application fees.76 It
would also extend the utility disconnection moratorium as long as

72. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Assistance for State, Local, and Tribal Governments, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-andtribal-governments [https://perma.cc/6CDL-VBYS].
73. See The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act § 5001(d)(3)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 801(d)(3)).
74. Gregory S. Schneider, State Sen. Jennifer McClellan Announces She’ll Run for
Virginia Governor in 2021, WASH. POST (June 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/local/virginia-politics/mcclellan-virginia-governor/2020/06/17/e4c1a0e2-b0cf-11ea
-8758-bfd1d045525a_story.html [https://perma.cc/PE8Y-SQ5N]. McClellan was eventually
defeated in the primary by Terry McAuliffe, who then lost the general election to Republican
Glenn Youngkin. See Gregory S. Schneider, Laura Vozzella & Antonio Olivo, Terry
McAuliffe Wins Democratic Nomination for Virginia Governor, WASH. POST (June 9, 2021,
12:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-primary-electi
on-results/2021/06/07/7167c92a-c4ae-11eb-9a8d-f95d7724967c_story.html [https://perma.cc
/X7QN-6DSL]; Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, Republican Glenn Youngkin Wins
Virginia Governor’s Race, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2021, 10:37 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-governor/2021/11/02/ba9c3ccc-36b2-11ec-91dc-551d
44733e2d_story.html [https://perma.cc/4JKL-4736].
75. S.B. 5118, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020) (as introduced, Aug. 19, 2020). The
companion bill in the House of Delegates was House Bill 5117, introduced by Delegate
Lashrecse Aird. H.B. 5117, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020) (as introduced, Aug. 24,
2020).
76. S.B. 5118.
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a customer’s debt repayment plan was in good standing. Under the
bill as introduced, repayments would be capped at $45.50/month
above the customer’s regular bill.77 Senate Bill 5118 did not mention and neither required nor precluded debt forgiveness, continuation of the moratorium, or any other relief options.78
Several advocacy groups supported Senate Bill 5118, including
environmental groups, groups representing lower-income Virginians, groups advocating for reform of Dominion’s monopoly power,
and faith-based groups.79 This coalition argued that repayment
plans would “allow utility customers to recover at a pace that will
give more room to pay all their utility and other obligations during
COVID-19 economic recovery.”80 During the session, Senator McClellan proposed a substitute to her bill that, among other provisions, would reduce the repayment plan term to twelve months
from twenty-four and remove the minimum monthly payment cap
on emergency debt repayment plans. One other change specified
that utilities would be allowed to recover costs related to the plans
through a rate adjustment clause (rider imposing a specific charge
on utility bills) or through base rate increases.81 The Senate approved the bill, as amended, on September 16,82 but neither it nor
its companion measure advanced in the House.83
On a second legislative track, the House and Senate proposed a
utility disconnection moratorium and the development of twelvemonth repayment plans as amendments to the omnibus budget
bill.84 Unlike Senate Bill 5118, the House language specified that
participating in a repayment plan would require proof of hardship
by the customer.85 Both budget bills included identical language

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Support SB5118/HB5117, VA. CONSERVATION NETWORK (Aug. 2020), http://www.v
cnva.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SB5118-HB5117.pdf[https://perma.cc/HWD5-JVT9].
81. See S.B. 5118, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020) (as approved by Senate, Sept.
16, 2020). This provision eventually became part of the final budget bill. See infra Part III.
82. Sarah Vogelsong, Senate Approves 12-Month Utility Debt Repayment Plans with Bipartisan Support, VA. MERCURY (Sept. 16, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://www.virginiamercury.
com/blog-va/senate-approves-12-month-utility-debt-repayment-plans-with-bipartisan-supp
ort/ [https://perma.cc/BR4T-3XNM].
83. S.B. 5118; H.B. 5117, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020).
84. The House’s budget bill was House Bill 5005; the Senate’s was Senate Bill 5015.
H.B. 5005, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020) (enacted as 2020 Va. Acts, Spec. Sess. I,
ch. 56); S.B. 5015, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020).
85. H.B. 5005.
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banning utility disconnections, but differed from each other in significant respects. The House budget amendments, but not the Senate’s, appropriated $100 million of CARES Act funding to satisfy
the debts of some customers who were in arrears.86 While they disagreed on this, the House and Senate proposals both incorporated
the language allowing utilities to recover their costs through rate
adjustment clauses or rate increases that had also been added to
Senate Bill 5118. Part III discusses how these proposals were eventually embodied in the budget bill instead of Governor Northam’s
proposal.87
C. Refunds for Utility Overcharges; Proposals For COVID-19
Relief
At the same time that legislators aimed to extend the disconnection moratorium and create repayment plans, a different legislative effort was underway to provide utility bill relief. This proposal
had its roots in a bill that narrowly failed to pass during the regular legislative session. That proposal, and its successor in the special session, aimed to modify the unusual provision of Virginia utility law that constrains the SCC’s ability to order refunds to state
utility ratepayers of overcharges by the state’s two largest investor-owned utilities—Dominion Energy Virginia (“Dominion”)88 and
Appalachian Power Company (“Appalachian Power”). This provision is part of a state utility law that is vastly more complex and
prescriptive than other states’ laws and had allowed Dominion, in
particular, to retain hundreds of millions of dollars in overcharges
in recent years. In the special session, the legislative proposal
aimed to change this outcome and attempted to steer some refund
amounts toward relief for those who could not pay their utility bills
during the pandemic.

86. Id.
87. See infra Part III.
88. Dominion Energy Virginia is part of Dominion Energy, a Fortune 500 company
headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, that serves nearly seven million customers in thirteen states. Our Company, DOMINION ENERGY, https://www.dominionenergy.com/our-com
pany [https://perma.cc/WJ2B-9VEQ].
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1. Code of Virginia Section 56-585.1: A Rube Goldberg
Contraption of State Utility Law
To understand the refund provision bills, it is essential to have
a grounding in the central principles of a single lengthy section of
Virginia’s utility law, the Code of Virginia section 56-585.1, that
governs the setting of Virginia electric utilities’ rates and other
matters.89 In regulating electric utilities subject to its jurisdiction,
the SCC performs classic core functions of a PUC: reviewing utilities’ rate applications and setting rates, making decisions about
new infrastructure, and determining how much of a utility’s costs
can be passed on to ratepayers.90 However, the section 56-585.1
framework has severely constrained its ratemaking discretion and
ability to order utility refunds.91
Section 56-585.1 modifies traditional rate regulation principles
with detailed prescriptions that apply to electric utilities that do
business in the state.92 The 2007’s “re-regulation” act, which ended
most retail electricity competition in Virginia, added this provision.93 In the transitional period between 1998 and 2007, utilities
in the state were not allowed to raise their rates—they were
“capped.” During this transitional period, Virginia and other states
attempted to switch to a system of retail competition in which customers could select a company other than their utility to supply
them electricity.94 But this is only of historical interest today, as
the 2007 law ended that transition.95
Section 56-585.1’s individual provisions govern numerous specific aspects of rate regulation in excruciating detail. For example,

89. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (2022).
90. The SCC regulates three investor-owned utilities and thirteen member-owned electric cooperatives, but not municipal utilities. See COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP.
COMM’N, STATUS REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRGINIA ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT PURSUANT TO § 56-596 B OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 2, 23, 28, 30 (2021), https:
//scc.virginia.gov/getattachment/0252ae1d-43cc-480b-a26e-e8bcd42f4658/2021-VEUR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95ZY-2WUA].
91. See generally GREENEHURLOCKER, GUIDE TO ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION IN
VIRGINIA 4 (2d ed. 2018), https://www.greenehurlocker.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gr
eeneHurlocker-Guide-to-Electric-Regulation-in-Va-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/26G8-A4CT].
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (2022).
93. William T. Reisinger, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Public Utilities Law, 49 U.
RICH. L. REV. 137, 137–43 (2014) (comprehensively explaining the evolution from the transitional period to the 2007 law).
94. Id. at 139–41.
95. Id. at 141–42.
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the first two paragraphs constrain the SCC’s normal role in setting
how much profit a utility can earn. The law specifies:
[T]he [SCC] may use any methodology to determine such [utility’s rate
of] return it finds consistent with the public interest, but such return
shall not be set lower than the average of the returns on common equity reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
three most recent annual periods for which such data are available by
not less than a majority, selected by the Commission as specified in
subdivision 2 b, of other investor-owned electric utilities in the peer
group of the utility, nor shall the Commission set such return more
than 300 basis points higher than such average.96

In other words, the SCC is instructed that there is a lower bound
to a utility’s profit at no less than average in its utility “peer
group.” Given that even a change of one-tenth of one percent can
make many millions in difference in a utility’s profit, this is a massive change in state law. The application of this provision has led
to returns for the state’s utilities that are above average compared
to other utilities in the nation.97
This Rube Goldberg contraption98 of statutory law is cumbersome and exceedingly challenging to read and interpret, so much
so that simply finding relevant language is a chore. Part of what
makes section 56-585.1 difficult to parse through is that when the
General Assembly has substantially amended it in the past (as it
did in 2018 and 2020), new, often lengthy text is simply added on.
When parts of it are no longer relevant or necessary, they are not
taken out, but remain like Banquo’s ghost to haunt the reader.99
This is obvious right from the outset: the section’s title includes
“after capped rates terminate or expire.”100 “Capped rates” refers
to the transitional period described above, which ended in the

96. § 56-585.1(A) (2022).
97. In 2017 and 2018, the SCC found that Dominion had over earned by $301 million
and $278 million, amounting to returns on equity of 13.84% and 13.47%, respectively.
COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, STATUS REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT PURSUANT TO § 56-596 B OF THE CODE OF
VIRGINIA, at iii (2020), https://scc.virginia.gov/getattachment/bef130f2-2e42-4c45-b128-f796
ab2fa444/2020veur.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DLM-YALV].
98. A Rube Goldberg contraption is an “overly complicated machine[]: using things like
pulleys, levers, birds, and rockets to fix simple problems.” Emily Wilson, The Story Behind
Rube Goldberg’s Complicated Contraptions, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 1, 2018), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/story-behind-rube-goldbergs-complicated-contraptions180968928/ [https://perma.cc/2CEL-R9YU].
99. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 3, sc. 4, l. 41.
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (2022).
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George W. Bush administration.101 And as if to punctuate this, the
very first sentence states, “[d]uring the first six months of 2009,
the Commission shall, after notice and opportunity for hearing, initiate proceedings to review the rates, terms and conditions for the
provision of generation, distribution and transmission services of
each investor-owned incumbent electric utility.”102
Little of section 56-585.1 resembles other states’ utility codes.
Those laws are typically much shorter and much less prescriptive,
providing more discretion to PUCs.103 In other states, PUCs normally set “just and reasonable” rates for utilities under venerated
principles established decades ago in Supreme Court precedents.104
These decisions require PUCs to consider the utility’s reasonable
and prudent cost of property used and whether it is useful for
providing adequate, safe, and reliable service to ratepayers; and to
set a rate of return on the utility’s rate base that is both fair to
ratepayers and provides an opportunity for the utility, through
sound management, to attract sufficient capital to maintain its financial strength.105 State utility codes typically contain some variant of this language,106 which provides considerable latitude to
regulators in rate cases. This is not the case in Virginia.
2. The Refund Provision and Proposed Use of Refunded
Overcharges for Pandemic-Related Utility Bill Relief
One complex provision in Code of Virginia section 56-585.1—
and, again, one that differs considerably from its counterparts in
other states—is central to understanding the legislative proposals
to steer utility refund amounts to provide for bill relief.107 This provision governs how refunds are made to ratepayers in the case of
utility overcharges when a utility subject to the SCC’s jurisdiction
makes excess profit during the time between rate cases.108 In
101. Reisinger, supra note 93, at 140.
102. § 56-585.1(A) (2022).
103. Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43 FLA. STATE
U. L. REV. 135, 144–45 (2015).
104. JIM LAZAR, REGUL. ASSIS. PROJ., ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 53
(2d ed. 2016), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/rap-lazar-electricityregulation-US-june-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7JV-98UC].
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-130 to -133 (2021).
107. This provision also factored into the SCC’s calculation of refunds for ratepayers in
Dominion’s 2021 triennial rate case, settled in November 2021. See infra Part III.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (2022).

EISEN-MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

176

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/23/2022 10:46 AM

[Vol. 57:155

normal cost-of-service (“COS”) rate regulation, a PUC fixes a utility’s rates by setting a revenue requirement which is the total
amount of revenue to which a utility is entitled to recover its costs
with an allowed rate of return.109 The revenue requirement is
based on a detailed calculation that incorporates such factors as a
utility’s projected sales over the period of years for which the rate
is set. In the period between one rate case and the next, the utility
may earn more than forecasted if, for example, it sells more electricity than anticipated.110 In a subsequent rate case, the PUC may
decide to order the utility to refund these overcharges to its customers.111
Virginia law governing refunds changes the normal calculus,
with statutory language that is about as tortured as it gets.112 The
SCC has some limited ability to order refunds, but the statute ties
the regulators’ hands. It provides that a utility only has to return
some over earnings to ratepayers and gets to keep the rest.113 The
utilities can keep any excess earnings up to seventy basis points
(0.7%) above authorized earnings.114 If the SCC finds that base rate
earnings during the three-year period leading to a triennial review
were more than that, the utilities get to keep even thirty percent
of those amounts with refunds of the remaining seventy percent
(that is, seventy percent of the amount over seventy basis points
above authorized earnings) due to ratepayers.115 After the 2018
amendments, even these limited refunds may be partially or completely offset by “customer credit reinvestment offsets” which involves plowing back refunds otherwise due into new capital investments in grid transformation projects or renewable energy
facilities.116 In addition, there was a $50 million cap on rate reductions for the 2021 triennial review for reasons not explained in the
statute.117

109. LAZAR, supra note 104, at 30.
110. Id. at 88.
111. Id.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(c)–(d) (2022).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2018). As of June 30, 2020, Dominion had identified nearly $200 million in projects it believed were eligible for use as offsets
in this fashion. COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, supra note 907, at iii.
117. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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After considerable research, the author found no comparable
provision in any other state that prescribes in detail how much of
a utility’s overcharges could be refunded to ratepayers. Nor does
any other state’s law cap refund amounts or allow utilities to plow
overcharges back into capital projects, bypassing refunds altogether.118 Generally, PUCs have broad latitude to decide whether
utilities have over-earned profits, and to order refunds as one part
of its rate orders, without limitations.119 The relevant language in
state utility codes is normally much shorter and not prescriptive,
if there is any at all. Often, there is not. As an example, in 2018,
the North Carolina Utilities Commission ordered the utility Duke
Energy to refund $60 million to ratepayers as part of a rate case.120
Its discussion of the relevant law mentioned only the typical broad
standards for rate setting.121
The Virginia utility refund provision has led to unjust results.
In the SCC’s final order in the 2015 rate case, for example, Dominion was allowed to keep over $100 million while only being ordered
to return $19.7 million to its customers.122 The problem loomed
large as the next rate case approached in 2021. Virginia law constrains when a rate case may be held: the SCC can only hold rate
cases every three years, in a “triennial review” proceeding123 and
not whenever a utility asks for one, as would be the case under
traditional rate regulation principles.124 For Dominion, the next
triennial review would take place in 2021.125 According to an SCC
report, Dominion’s overearnings totaled more than $500 million
118. Patrick Wilson, Power Play: Inside the Dominion Lobbying Blitz That’s Going to
Raise Your Electric Bills, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 10, 2020), https://richmond.com/n
ews/state-and-regional/power-play-inside-the-dominion-lobbying-blitz-thats-going-to-raiseyour-electric-bills/article_febc3bc7-37cd-5ff8-90d6-fd303849765d.html [https://perma.cc/YD
Z6-FNZ7] (quoting the author as being “unaware of any comparable provision elsewhere in
the nation that allows a utility to take money that a commission would otherwise decide it
has to give back to ratepayers and allow the utility to plow that into new projects”).
119. LAZAR, supra note 104, at 103.
120. Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket No. E-7, Sub. 1146, at 15 (N.C.
Util. Comm’n June 22, 2018), https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f
3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23 [https://perma.cc/8JS9-NW79] (order accepting stipulation, deciding contested issues, and requiring revenue reduction).
121. Id. (relying on North Carolina General Statute section 62-133 and ordering the refund as part of the findings).
122. Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUE-2015-00027, 2015 Va. PUC LEXIS 944, at *28 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Nov. 23, 2015) (final order).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(1) (2022).
124. See generally JOEL B. EISEN, EMILY HAMMOND, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B. SPENCE &
HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 479–574 (5th ed. 2020).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

EISEN-MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

178

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/23/2022 10:46 AM

[Vol. 57:155

between 2017 and 2019.126 Whether any or all of this amount would
be refunded to customers in the 2021 proceeding (or at any other
time, if the law were changed) became a major political issue in
Virginia that attracted much attention.127
To address the refund provision and Dominion’s overcharges in
the 2017-2019 period, Delegates R. Lee Ware, a Republican, and
Jerrauld C. “Jay” Jones, a Democrat, introduced the Fair Energy
Bills Act (“FEBA”) in the regular 2020 legislative session.128 This
proposal had three core elements. First, it changed the regulatory
standards for the 2021 triennial review (and only that one, not future ones).129 It authorized the SCC to use familiar COS principles
to determine Dominion’s rate of return rather than the prescriptive
framework of section 56-585.1.130 Second, it specified that in the
2021 triennial review, the SCC would order whatever refunds it
deemed necessary, bypassing the section 56-585.1 refund provision
and the restrictive $50 million revenue reduction cap.131 Finally, it
precluded Dominion from using the customer credit reinvestment
126. COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, supra note 97, at iii.
127. Wilson, supra note 118. Eventually, a settlement was reached that resulted in some
refunds. See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
128. H.B. 1132, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2020) (as amended in the nature of a
substitute, Feb. 6, 2020); Kate Andrews, SCC: Dominion Overcharged Customers by $502M
in 2017–19, VA. BUS. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.virginiabusiness.com/article/scc-reportdominion-overcharged-customers-by-502m-in-2017-19/ [https://perma.cc/0ZLM-PM DP].
129. Interestingly, Virginia law actually still contains the statutory framework for traditional cost of service ratemaking, and it exists in parallel to section 56-585.1. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-232 to -245.1:2 (2022). The 2007 re-regulation law that created section 56-585.1
specified that this section governed in place of the traditional law, while leaving those provisions intact in the Code. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A) (2007) (stating that “[s]uch proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 10 (§ 56-232 et seq.), except as modified herein”). So, to return the 2021 triennial review to traditional rate regulation standards, House Bill 1132 provided that such “initial triennial review . . . shall consist of a
generation and distribution rate case conducted solely pursuant to (i) Chapter 10 (§ 56-232
et seq.) of Title 56 of the Code of Virginia [that is, the pre-2007 framework]; (ii) the rules of
the State Corporation Commission . . . ; and (iii) this act.” H.B. 1132. Because it applied cost
of service standards to the “initial triennial review,” House Bill 1132 would only have affected the 2021 rate case. See id.
130. House Bill 1132 authorized the SCC to “order any rate adjustments . . . and to use
any methodology to determine the fair rate of return on common equity that it finds consistent with the public interest, provided that such return shall be set at a level that is (a)
sufficient to assure confidence in the utility’s financial integrity; (b) adequate to maintain
and support the utility’s credit and its ability to attract capital; and (c) comparable to returns that . . . investors in securities would expect to earn on investments of similar risk.”
H.B. 1132.
131. House Bill 1132 directed the SCC to “review the earnings during the utility’s test
periods . . . [and] order credits to customers in amounts equal to any earnings during the
combined test periods that are above the . . . Utility’s authorized rate of return in effect on
July 1, 2020” as determined in the initial triennial review. Id.
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offset mechanism in the 2021 triennial review to avoid making refunds to its customers.132
The FEBA was “one of the most significant pieces of energy legislation”133 in the regular session, along with the VCEA, which revolutionized the state’s approach to promoting clean and renewable
energy.134 The FEBA’s co-patrons argued that it was crucial to
change the standards that would apply in the 2021 review, because
that proceeding would set base rates for years to come.135 Indeed,
using traditional rate regulation instead of the section 56-585.1
framework would have had “major impacts on the electric bills Dominion Energy customers pay.”136 Despite this, and even though
the FEBA had strong bipartisan support, it faced an uphill battle
from the start because it was directed solely at Dominion.137 Nonetheless, it passed the House by an overwhelming 77-23 margin,
only to subsequently fail in a dramatic Senate committee meeting
by one vote after what was described as “intense” pressure by Dominion.138
Undeterred, the FEBA’s patrons brought forth a similar but narrower bill in the special session, House Bill 5088.139 This time, instead of aiming to change the criteria by which the 2021 triennial
review would be conducted, they focused solely on the refund provision. The co-patrons made another important change. Instead of
simply lifting the cap and allowing the SCC to make whatever refund it deemed necessary, House Bill 5088 specified that Domin132. See id.
133. Sarah Vogelsong, Is the Bipartisan Fair Energy Bills Act Facing Its Demise in the
Senate?, VA. MERCURY (Feb. 21, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/
02/21/bipartisan-fair-energy-bills-act-facing-headwinds-in-senate/ [https://perma.cc/NC9Y7L2H].
134. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1193 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-585.1:11, -585.5, -585.6
(Cum. Supp. 2020)); see Sarah Vogelsong, Virginia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Special
Series by the Virginia Mercury, VA. MERCURY (Nov. 30, 2020, 12:02 AM), https://www.virg
iniamercury.com/2020/11/30/virginias-clean-energy-transition-a-special-series-by-the-virgi
nia-mercury/ [https://perma.cc/6HZP-MJKL] (five-part series describing the VCEA and its
significance for the state’s clean energy transition).
135. Vogelsong, supra note 133.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see generally Wilson, supra note 118.
138. Sarah Vogelsong, After Intense Dominion Lobbying, Senate Panel Kills Bipartisan
Fair Energy Bills Act, VA. MERCURY (Mar. 2, 2020, 10:09 PM), https://www.virginiamercury.
com/2020/03/02/after-intense-dominion-lobbying-senate-panel-kills-bipartisan-fair-energybills-act/ [https://perma.cc/XY6Z-49UB].
139. H.B. 5088, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2020). The identical bill in the Senate
was Senate Bill 5085, whose patron was Senator John J. Bell. S.B. 5085, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Spec Sess. 2020).
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ion’s overcharges from recent years would be used for three different purposes. The first seventy percent of overearnings would be
issued as emergency refunds to customers impacted by the pandemic.140 The remaining thirty percent would go into a new fund
administered by the SCC that would provide electricity bill relief
for customers who were in arrears to Dominion as of August 31,
2020.141 As noted above, the SCC had already reported that customers were behind in their payments to Dominion by over $100
million. This new fund would go a long way toward alleviating the
problem. The remaining funds, if any, would also go to help struggling, lower-income consumers.142
This bill was appealing. It had almost thirty co-sponsors in the
House,143 and a broad-based coalition of twenty-seven organizations—including environmental advocates, the Virginia Poverty
Law Center and other advocates for lower-income Virginians, and
others—urged the General Assembly to pass it.144 They claimed
that Dominion was merely returning money to its customers that
it was not entitled to keep.145 They also argued that these millions
of dollars in refunds would make an immediate difference to those
in Virginia who were most affected by utility bills during the pandemic.146 Because the bill would use Dominion’s funds, it would not
have a budgetary impact, leaving other available state and federal
funding to be directed elsewhere. Unfortunately, the coalition support and the advocacy by the bill’s patrons did little to move House
Bill 5088 forward. It failed to advance in the Senate committee and
was never docketed for a hearing by the relevant House committee.147

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

H.B. 5088.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Letter from 350 Fairfax et al. to Members of Va. Gen. Assembly, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
H.B. 5088.
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III. GOVERNOR NORTHAM’S PROPOSAL—OUTCOME OF THE
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
On September 3, Governor Northam announced a proposal for
budget language148 that effectively married the best features of the
two different legislative efforts: Senate Bill 5118’s provisions that
allowed consumers affected by utility bills during the pandemic to
stretch out repayment over a number of months, and House Bill
5088’s proposal to provide bill relief without new state spending by
using Dominion’s millions of dollars in overcharges for this purpose. With the disconnection moratorium about to end, Governor
Northam called on the General Assembly to extend the moratorium to address the looming catastrophe of an upcoming winter
with a pandemic raging and utility customers facing continued
hardship. As noted below, this effort largely did not succeed, but
the final budget bill did provide some relief for those suffering from
high energy burdens.
A. Governor Northam’s Proposal and Utility Bill Relief in the
Final Budget Bill
In September 2020, Governor Northam proposed to extend the
disconnection moratorium for as long as the pandemic continued,
and then some, until sixty days after the termination of Virginia’s
state of emergency declaration.149 His proposal also aimed to direct
$320 million of Dominion’s overearnings toward the forgiveness of
unpaid utility bills. Customers’ bills more than sixty days overdue
as of September 30 would be forgiven, and funds would be set aside
to cover bills ninety days past due at the point in time when the
moratorium eventually ended.150 Under Virginia’s budget process,
this proposal could not be adopted on its own, but required action
by the House and Senate. Dozens of advocacy groups banded together to support the proposal, taking out a full-page newspaper
ad.151 Virginia’s Attorney General, Mark Herring, wrote in support

148. Alan Suderman, Northam Wants Dominion Energy to Forgive Overdue Electric Bills
Using $320M in Over-Earnings, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, (Sept. 3, 2020, 8:25 PM), https://www.pil
otonline.com/business/consumer/vp-nw-northam-dominion-electric-bill-forgiveness-202009
04-weqj5kf2bvcnrbexwvicy7dtoq-story.html [https://perma.cc/KB7U-HN5L].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. In Full-Page Richmond Times-Dispatch Ad, Organizations Call on Lawmakers to
Force Dominion Energy Refunds, CLEAN VA. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.cleanvirginia.org/
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to members of the General Assembly, pointing out that the House’s
proposed language would only offer an estimated $74 million in relief, far less than Governor Northam had sought.152
Following the Governor’s announcement, however, the House
and Senate did not act on its central call to use Dominion’s overcharges for utility bill relief.153 The bill adopted the House’s version
of the budget language that directed utilities to use CARES Act
funding for this purpose.154 The final budget language extended the
moratorium on utility disconnections “until the Governor determines that the economic and public health conditions have improved such that the prohibition does not need to be in place, or
until at least 60 days after such declared state of emergency ends,
whichever is sooner.”155 This applied to both investor-owned and
municipal utilities, unlike previous moratoria by the SCC, which
had no jurisdiction to impose one on the latter.156 Governor
Northam ended Virginia’s state of emergency on June 30, 2021,157
so the moratorium ended in August 2021.158 Customers who were
thirty days in arrears to their utility could take advan- tage of a
“COVID-19 Relief Repayment Plan,” under which utilities were required to offer payment plans extending from six to twenty-four

in-full-page-richmond-times-dispatch-ad-organizations-call-on-lawmakers-to-force-domini
on-energy-refunds/ [https://perma.cc/5D9F-ZRVA].
152. Mark R. Herring, Att’y Gen., Re: Budget Bill—Utility Disconnection Moratorium,
COMMONWEALTH OF VA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.oag.state.v
a.us/media-center/news-releases/1836-september-29-2020-herring-supports-governornorth
am-s-budget-proposal-to-utilize-dominion-overearnings-toward-utility-relief-for-virginians
[https://perma.cc/6U72-YM58].
153. Kelly Roache, Virginia Budget Amendments May Allow Dominion Energy to Pass
COVID Debt Forgiveness Costs on to Ratepayers Later, ENERGY & POL’Y INST. (Sept. 29,
2020), [https://www.energyandpolicy.org/va-budget-dominion-covid-debt/ [https://perma.cc
/47ZF-6WYG].
154. COMMONWEALTH OF VA., GEN. ASSEMB., UTILITY DISCONNECTION MORATORIUM
LANGUAGE, Spec. Sess. I, at 2 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
155. Id. at 1. The state of emergency was originally established by the Governor’s Executive Order 51 (2020) on March 12, 2020, which provided that the state of emergency “shall
remain in full force and in effect until June 10, 2020 unless sooner amended or rescinded by
further executive order.” Va. Exec. Order No. 51 (Mar. 12, 2020), http://rosetta.virginiamem
ory.com:1801/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE3440368 [https://perma.cc/Z4M
5-7BUE].
156. COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, supra note 90, at 1‒2.
157. Sarah Vogelsong, Budget Includes $120 Million in Additional Utility Assistance, VA.
MERCURY (Aug. 9, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.virginiamercury.com/2021/08/09/amidbudget-debates-120-million-utility-assistance-proposal-sparks-little-controversy/ [https://p
erma.cc/8VSV-GFQ2].
158. Id.
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months.159 Utilities are not allowed to report to credit agencies that
customers have fallen behind on their bills, and some bills would
be forgiven in their entirety. “Within 60 days after the enactment
of this act,” the relevant language provided that “[Dominion] shall
forgive all such utility’s jurisdictional customer balances more
than 30 days in arrears as of September 30, 2020.”160
B. Impact on Virginia’s Utilities
Going forward, as both versions of the budget bill and Senate
Bill 5118 had provided, utilities could recover costs resulting from
administration of the Repayment Plan program from their ratepayers. This could be done either through a rate adjustment clause
(rider) or through base rate increases.161 As for the amounts spent
to forgive debt, the utilities would not be on the hook for those,
either. The final budget bill did not require Dominion to use overcharges to forgive this debt. Instead, it did the opposite: in the next
rate case, Dominion could recover amounts it spent from its ratepayers.162 It would take a master wordsmith with a sophisticated
understanding of the section 56-585.1 framework to understand
this dense language that immediately follows the requirement that
Dominion forgive its customers’ debts:
In the utility’s 2021 triennial review, any forgiven amounts shall be
excluded from the utility’s cost of service for purposes of determining
any test period earnings and determining any future rates of the utility. In determining any customer bill credits, in the utility’s 2021 triennial review, the Commission shall first offset any forgiven amounts
against the total earnings for the 2017 through 2020 test periods that
are determined to be above the utility’s authorized earnings band.
Such offset shall be made prior to any offset to customer bill credits
by customer credit reinvestment offsets.163

Because the legislative proposals to change it were unsuccessful,
section 56-585.1’s convoluted refund provision continued to apply
to the 2021 triennial review proceeding.164 Dominion would be able
to keep a large portion of whatever the SCC deemed it had over

159. COMMONWEALTH OF VA., GEN. ASSEMB., UTILITY DISCONNECTION MORATORIUM
LANGUAGE, Spec. Sess. I, at 1 (2020) (Conf. Rep.).
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. at 2.
162. VA. CODE. ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
163. H.B. 5005.
164. VA. CODE. ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

EISEN-MASTER COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

184

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/23/2022 10:46 AM

[Vol. 57:155

earned—as noted above, it could legally keep all excess earnings
up to seventy basis points (0.7%) above authorized earnings.
Amounts spent to forgive customer debt would then be “offset . . .
against the total earnings . . . that are determined to be above the
utility’s authorized earnings band” (that is, the already high
amounts of earnings that Dominion is allowed).165 This might reduce overearnings enough so that Dominion would get to keep all
of them. And, as the last sentence provides, it could still claim the
“customer credit reinvestment offsets” for new capital projects to
reduce refunds still further.166
Stephen Haner, an author of the Bacon’s Rebellion blog and a
long-time observer of the General Assembly’s comings and goings
on energy laws and policies, called this provision “clever and complicated.”167 As he pointed out, “Dominion and its customers are
getting special treatment . . . hav[ing] been promised that they will
eventually be made whole, and their unpaid and uncollectible bills
will be covered by rate hikes on their remaining customers.”168 As
Haner put it, no other business in Virginia was allowed by statute
to pass off its pandemic-related costs onto consumers.169 Others
were even more critical, charging that Dominion was “exploiting
the emergency special session and the current crisis for its own
economic benefit.”170
In the end, a settlement was reached among the parties in the
2021 triennial review proceeding.171 The SCC approved customer
refunds totaling $330 million ($75 million of which was deemed a

165. H.B. 5005.
166. Id.
167. Steve Haner, Dominion [Heart] New Utility Bill Payment Plan, BACON’S REBELLION
(Sept. 29. 2020), https://www.baconsrebellion.com/wp/dominion-%E2%9D%A4-new-utilitybill-payment-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2SLE-24Z2].
168. Tyler Arnold, Virginia Looks to Forgive Customer Utility Debt with COVID-19
Funds, Excess Dominion Profits, THE CTR. SQUARE (Oct. 19. 2020), https://www.thecenter
square.com/virginia/virginia-looks-to-forgive-customer-utility-debt-with-covid-19-funds-exc
ess-dominion-profits/article_70c67848-1321-11eb-a52c-47a44bb38ad9.html [https://perma.
cc/67QH-5RVP].
169. Id.
170. Virginia House and Senate Fail to Refund Any of the $500 Million Dominion Energy
Has Overcharged Virginians, CLEAN VA. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.cleanvirginia.org/ virginia-house-and-senate-fail-to-refund-any-of-the-500-million-dominion-energy-has-over
charged-virginians/ [https://perma.cc/DR9E-ZJSD].
171. See generally Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUR-2021-00058 (Commonwealth of Va. State
Corp. Comm’n Nov. 18, 2021), https://scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/618m01!.PDF
[https://perma.cc/9PQ7-QNB7] (order modifying stipulation).
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“voluntary” refund) and a revenue reduction of $50 million.172 This
would give a decrease of about $0.90 per month to a typical residential customer using 1,000 kilowatt hours (“kWh”) per month.173
Some believe the refunds were inadequate,174 but under the existing law with its limits on rate reductions, many acknowledged that
this was as much as could have been done.175 However, this leaves
substantial overcharges largely unaccounted for, and lower-income
Virginians will continue to overpay for a basic service.
IV. PERCENTAGE OF INCOME PAYMENT PROGRAM (“PIPP”)
The PIPP, another recent effort designed to help Virginia’s
lower-income customers with their utility bills, is based on similar
programs in other states. These programs are collectively known
as “ratepayer funded” because funding to assist lower-income utility customers comes from other utility customers (ratepayers).176
The central feature of Virginia’s PIPP, like those of other states, is
that participating utility customers pay no more than a set percentage of their household income for utility service. That percentage is deemed to be affordable. Virginia’s PIPP was created by statute (the VCEA and subsequent legislation in 2021),177 with Ohio’s
long-standing program cited as a model. Responsibility for developing and implementing the program has been divided between
the SCC and the DSS in consultation with the DHCD. As of the
date of this Article, many details are still being worked out in regulations to be promulgated by the DSS, and the program will not

172. Id. at 3 n.8.
173. Id.
174. Diana Williams, Dominion Energy Virginia Customers Should Receive Refunds
Soon, No Thanks to the Monopoly, CLEAN VA. (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.cleanvirginia.org/
dominion-energy-virginia-customers-should-receive-refunds-soon-no-thanks-to-the-mono
poly/ [https://perma.cc/M8ZF-RQ25] (noting that “Dominion is getting away with only refunding a fraction of the $1.1 billion it overcharged customers”).
175. Press Release, S. Env’t. L. Ctr., SELC Statement on Settlement Agreement in Dominion Energy Rate Case (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.southernenvironment.org/press-rele
ase/selc-statement-on-settlement-agreement-in-dominion-energy-rate-case/ [https://perma.
cc/975V-PD8S].
176. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 29.
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.6 (Cum. Supp. 2021). In some other states, it has been unclear whether PUCs can create PIPPs under their existing statutory authorities. APPLIED
PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST. FOR STUDY & EVALUATION, RATEPAYER-FUNDED LOW-INCOME
ENERGY PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBILITIES 22 (2007), http://www.appriseinc.or
g/reports/NLIEC%20Multi-Sponsor%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB6G-Q8EP]. Because
Virginia’s program was expressly created by statute, that is not an issue here.
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begin until one year after the issuance of these implementing regulations.
This Part begins by discussing the types of ratepayer-funded
support programs that states have established to make utility bill
assistance available for lower-income customers. It will then explain the basic structure of PIPPs and some important design variables which policymakers must consider in establishing a PIPP.
Finally, it explains how some issues were addressed in Virginia’s
statutory enactments, some have been the subject of SCC orders,
and some await the development of DSS regulations.
A. Percentage of Income Payment Program—Definition and
Features
A 2021 report from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
found that at least thirty states have ratepayer-funded programs
of some sort that are designed to assist utility customers with paying their bills.178 Many programs have been in place for decades. A
2007 study commissioned by a broad range of sponsors including
utilities, public interest groups, and state agencies, examined programs underway in thirteen states, some of which had been in
place for years at that point.179 One caveat is that not all programs
offer comprehensive electric and gas bill relief, and “[p]rograms
vary widely in funding and benefit levels, eligibility criteria, administrative structures, and number of customers served.”180
There are three basic types of ratepayer-funded bill assistance
programs: (1) PIPP, (2) programs offering qualifying customers flat
percentage discounts on their utility bills, and (3) programs offering tiered discounts (a hybrid of the first two types).181 Generally
speaking, these programs share three common features: (1) assistance for qualifying low-income ratepayers with their utility bills;
(2) ratepayer funding through imposition of a “universal service
fee” (a small charge on other customers of the utility) to fund the
program; and (3) administration by PUCs, sometimes in conjunction with other state agencies.182

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 29.
APPLIED PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST. FOR STUDY & EVALUATION, supra note 177, at i.
FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 29.
Id. at 32.
See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 32.
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In 1983, Ohio became the first state to institute a PIPP,183 and
the program, currently the nation’s largest, was subsequently updated in 1996 and 2010.184 As a well-known, long-standing program, Ohio’s PIPP served as a template for development of Virginia’s PIPP.185 Ohio’s current program, called “PIPP Plus,”
requires participating households that heat with natural gas to
pay five percent of their monthly income or ten dollars per month
to their gas or electric company, whichever is greater.186 Customers
using only electricity pay ten percent of their income or ten dollars,
whichever is greater, as their monthly payment.187 This program
has been robust for quite some time; for example, in 2005 Ohio’s
PIPP was already funded at over $200 million annually.188 Today,
in addition to Ohio, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania have PIPPs.189
Each PIPP must address a number of different issues. This Section discusses several of the most important (although certainly
not all), beginning with decisions about who qualifies for the program and what constitutes an affordability goal. Because a PIPP
limits the amount of utility bill payments to a specific percentage
of household income, policymakers must establish income eligibility requirements and bill payment percentage targets.190 A 2021
report from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory recommended that income eligibility be determined with reference to the
guidelines set for assistance under the federal Low-Income Home
183. Investigation into Long-Term Solution Concerning Disconnection of Gas and Electric Service in Winter Emergencies, No. 83-303-GE-COI (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, Nov.
23, 1983), https://dis.puc.state.oh.us/ViewImage.aspx?CMID=A1001001A15F09B15148B6
3761 [https://perma.cc/4GWG-B4D4] (opinion & order); Janine Migden-Ostrander, Use Less,
Save More: Adding a Conservation Incentive to Percentage of Income Payment Programs,
REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.raponline.org/blog/use-less-savemore-adding-a-conservation-incentive-to-percentage-of-income-payment-programs/ [https:
//perma.cc/84M9-JLWN].
184. PIPP Plus, OHIO PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://puco.ohio.gov/utilities/gas/resources/pi
pp-plus [https://perma.cc/UMZ3-N4U2]; see Tamara S. Turkenton, OHIO PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N, Ohio’s Low-Income Programs, NAT’L ASS’N REGUL. UTILITY COMM’RS (June 17–21,
2013), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id=536FA396-2354-D714-5125-ED065311D09B [htt
ps://perma.cc/FB4L-954M].
185. For example, one group called Ohio’s PIPP an “excellent model” for Virginia to follow. About, Va. Energy Reform Coalition, https://www.virginiaenergyreform.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/4J4D-LUUE].
186. OHIO PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 183.
187. Id.
188. APPLIED PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST. FOR STUDY & EVALUATION, STATE REPORT—OHIO
16, http://www.appriseinc.org/reports/MSS_OH.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAA5-5RJ2].
189. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 33.
190. Id.
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Energy Assistance Program (“LIHEAP”).191 LIHEAP is an existing
federal program that provides energy assistance to qualified
households,192 although observers note that more help is needed
because it serves only a small proportion of those eligible for benefits.193 States set LIHEAP income eligibility standards in accordance with federal law, which determines that a household must
have an income that does not exceed more than 150% of the federal
poverty guideline or sixty percent of the state median income to be
eligible.194 In addition to setting PIPP income guidelines to harmonize with these limits, consumer advocates have recommended
that eligible PIPP customers be automatically enrolled in the program to ensure its maximum reach.195
A second series of decisions about a PIPP relates to program
funding, where two types of considerations are important. The
overall amount of funding must be sufficient to alleviate the energy
insecurity of eligible utility customers, with a funding stream that
is adequate to meet this goal and made available through appropriate design of the universal service fee.196 Also, the program must
be designed to provide effective administration, with funding via
the fee covering administrative costs. By one estimate, five to seven

191. Id. at 30.
192. The LIHEAP, established in 1981, provides block grant funds and emergency funds
to states, territories and tribes to assist low-income households with heating and cooling
expenses and home weatherizing. The LIHEAP program is headquartered in the federal
Department of Health & Human Services, which awards funds to state agencies that supervise their distribution. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF CMTY. SERVS., Low
Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ocs/low-inco
me-home-energy-assistance-program-liheap [https://perma.cc/3QF7-GKP9]; U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF CMTY. SERVS., LIHEAP’s 40th Anniversary, https://www.
acf.hhs.gov/ocs/liheaps-40th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/3KBA-LQ9S]. Virginia’s regulations implementing the program are found in the Virginia Administrative Code. 22 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 40-680-10-70 (2022).
193. Scott Bechler, How a Decades-Old Federal Energy Assistance Program Functions in
Practice: A Deep Dive into LIHEAP, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’TL POL’Y SOLS. 4 (Apr. 2021),
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/How-a-Decades-Old-Fede
ral-Energy-Assistance-Program-Functions-in-Practice-A-Deep-Dive-into-LIHEAP.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/SBT7-4VWJ] (noting that the program only serves fifteen percent of eligible
households).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(2)(B).
195. See, e.g., APPLIED PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST. FOR STUDY & EVALUATION, supra note
188, at 18, 21.
196. John Howat, Electric Service Discount and Arrearage Management Program Design
Template, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 5–6 (Apr. 2020), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/spec
ial_projects/covid-19/WP_Program_Design_Template.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZDD-KB MX].
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percent of total funding is necessary to cover these costs, but this
varies with the program structure.197
Another issue that has arisen is the relationship between a PIPP
and other programs designed to reduce customer usage of electricity (collectively known as “demand-side management” or
“DSM”).198 With a cap on a utility bill set at a percentage of household income, the eligible customer enrolled in the PIPP pays the
same bill regardless of the amount of electricity they consume, so
there is no incentive for them to use less.199 Without some mechanism to account for this, this could potentially increase consumption, the amount of funding necessary to offset the difference, and
the fee that other customers pay.200 On the other hand, a solution
such as requiring participants in the PIPP to also take part in a
DSM program could serve as an effective barrier to their participation and make it more difficult to aid struggling utility customers.201 With this in mind, some have proposed other potential ways
of handling the concern about reducing energy usage, such as creating a “conservation incentive” that would reward participants
who reduce their electricity consumption.202
B. Development and Implementation of the Virginia PIPP
Virginia’s PIPP was established in a provision of the VCEA,
which, as noted above, is the landmark 2020 law that commits Virginia to a sweeping clean energy transition.203 Similar to Ohio, the
Virginia PIPP aims to limit the percentage of utility bills paid by
qualifying low-income consumers to six percent or ten percent of
their annual household income, depending on their household
heating source, with the shortfall being made up through imposition of a universal service fee that creates a “Percentage of Income

197. Id. at 5.
198. See Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways and
Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 369 (2017).
199. Janine Migden-Ostrander, Use Less, Save More: Adding a Conservation Incentive to
Percentage of Income Payment Programs, REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.raponline.org/blog/use-less-save-more-adding-a-conservation-incentive-to-per
centage-of-income-payment-programs/ [https://perma.cc/84M9-JLWN].
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1193 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.6 (Cum. Supp. 2020));
see Vogelsong, supra note 133.
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Payment Fund” (“Fund”) to support the PIPP.204 The VCEA provision required the SCC to set the level of the universal service fee
for the state’s two largest investor-owned utilities (Dominion and
Appalachian Power) to be paid by all utility customers not participating in the program.205 In June 2020, the SCC issued orders directing the two utilities to file proposals to establish universal service fees.206 That December, the SCC entered final orders in both
dockets, fixing the utilities’ PIPP fees.207 Anticipating that the law
might be revised in the next General Assembly session, the SCC
also ordered the utilities to file for review and revision of the fees
if the law were changed.208
In the 2021 legislative session, the General Assembly amended
and expanded the PIPP.209 The new law expanded the definition of
“[PIPP] eligible utility customer” by removing language from the
2020 law that made customers eligible if they participated in specific public assistance programs.210 The definition now provides
that any person or household whose income does not exceed 150%
of the federal poverty level is eligible.211 In addition to expanding
and refining the program eligibility criteria, the revised 2021 law
changed program administration by bifurcating responsibility between the SCC and the DSS.212 The SCC is responsible for setting
the universal service fee at a level designed to meet program objectives, setting the administrative costs of the program, ensuring
that funds collected are directed to the Fund, and providing for cost
recovery by Appalachian Power and Dominion for all reasonable
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.6 (2022).
205. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1193.
206. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, at 1, 3 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp.
Comm’n June 12, 2020), https://scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/4ngl01!.PDF [https://
perma.cc/SYY9-K563] (order establishing proceeding); Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUR-202000109, at 1, 3 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n June 11, 2020), https://scc.virg
inia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/4ngc01!.PDF [https://perma.cc/5R4U-DPJM] (order establishing proceeding).
207. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 936, at *15 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Dec. 23, 2020) (order); Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUR2020-00109, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 920, at *15 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n
Dec. 23, 2020) (order).
208. Appalachian Power Co., 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 936, at *15; Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 920, at *15.
209. 2021 Va. Acts, Spec. Sess. I, ch. 308 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56576, -585.6) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
210. Id.
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-576 (Cum. Supp. 2021). This harmonizes the Code of Virginia’s
definition with that of the LIHEAP.
212. 2021 Va. Acts, Spec. Sess. I, ch. 308.
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PIPP costs from the Fund, including bill credits for PIPP-eligible
customers.213 The law directed the DSS to establish rules and
guidelines for adoption, implementation, and general administration of the program and the Fund.214
The 2021 revisions to the law settled some other issues discussed
above. It set caps on the annual cost of PIPP-related programs, including administrative costs, at $25 million for Appalachian Power
and $100 million for Dominion.215 The 2020 law had no specific provision determining whether eligible participants could be required
to take part in energy reduction programs. In 2020, participants in
the SCC universal service fee dockets disagreed about this issue,216
but the SCC order eventually read the law to require participation
in energy reduction programs.217 The revised law changed this,
leaving the resolution of this issue to the sole discretion of the DSS.
The current law provides that the DSS’s “rules or guidelines shall
include exemptions for terms of program participation or energy
use reduction as the [DSS] deems appropriate”218 and expressly
states that “PIPP-eligible customers may, to the extent reasonably
possible, utilize existing energy efficiency or related [utility] programs.”219
In April 2021, responding to the new law and in particular its
expansion of eligibility criteria, the SCC directed Appalachian
Power and Dominion to file updated proposals for establishing the
level of the universal service fee.220 In response, both utilities made
filings that stated the expanded eligibility requirements would

213. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.6(A)–(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
214. Id. § 56-585.6(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
215. Id. § 56-585.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
216. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, at 4–5 (Commonwealth of Va. State
Corp. Comm’n May 28, 2021), https://scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/4z%24%2501!.
PDF [https://perma.cc/QU56-SJYM] (comments of Sierra Club in response to order).
217. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, 2020 Va. PUC LEXIS 936, at *12 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Dec. 23, 2020) (order) (directed against both Appalachian and Dominion). As noted above, the SCC anticipated new legislation in the 2021 General Assembly session, so its order took this position on participation in energy reduction
programs “unless and until another way is apparent to accomplish the objectives of the PIPP
fee as set forth in Code § 56-585.6(A).” Id. at *13.
218. VA. CODE. ANN. § 56-585.6(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
219. Id. § 56-585.6(D) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
220. See Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, 2021 Va. PUC LEXIS 681, at *3–4,
*16–17 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2021) (order on additional proceedings); Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUR-2020-00109, 2021 Va. PUC LEXIS 678, at *3–4, *16–
17 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2021) (order on additional proceedings).
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increase the number of customers taking part and the overall program costs.221 Later in 2021, after further proceedings, the SCC
limited the fee level to the amounts necessary to provide for the
estimated start-up costs for DSS to establish the PIPP,222 leaving
the dockets open to consider setting a different fee after the DSS
regulations determine the program’s scope. As of mid-2022, the
DSS had not completed the rulemaking effort to establish the program’s details.223 The rules may address such issues as synchronization with other public assistance programs and enrollment
mechanisms, as discussed above. Because the General Assembly
did not specify a start date for the program—but instead provided
that it would start one year after the DSS promulgated regulations—there is no official program start date as yet.224
While the exact contours of the Virginia PIPP are therefore yet
to be determined, the state will now have a mechanism to alleviate
some of the energy burden from qualifying households. Without
the new rules in place, it is not known how much of the actual problem might be addressed. Further assessment of this may come in
the DSS gap analysis report due in November 2022.225 If the caps
do not provide for enough relief, particularly given the exigencies
of the pandemic for lower income households, the General Assembly might need to revisit them.
V. ENERGY JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA IN 2022
The General Assembly’s efforts throughout 2020 to provide for
utility bill relief and the settlement of the 2021 triennial rate case
were only partially successful to help those in the most need, and
did not satisfy those who wanted more to be done. But the 2020
budget bill provision did, at least, shield some customers from the
harshest consequences of disconnection. “The good news,” one
221. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117, at 3–4 (Commonwealth of Va. State
Corp. Comm’n May 12, 2021), https://scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/4wlb01!.PDF
[https://perma.cc/F2R5-NUW7] (supplemental filing of Appalachian Power Company).
222. Appalachian Power Co., PUR-2020-00117 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp.
Comm’n July 29, 2021), https://scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/5%40z501!.PDF [https:
//perma.cc/RC4J-FJYS] (order); Va. Elec. & Power Co., PUR-2020-00109, 2021 Va. PUC
LEXIS 686, at *5, *8 (Commonwealth of Va. State Corp. Comm’n July 29, 2021) (order).
223. Regulatory Activity, VA. REG. TOWN HALL (2022), https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/n
owinprogress.cfm [https://perma.cc/SG4Y-ZBBG] (DSS PIPP regulations not listed as promulgated).
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.6(C) (2022).
225. Id. § 56-585.6(D) (2022).
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group observed, “is that lawmakers just passed a budget that seeks
to protect Virginians from electricity disconnections due to overdue
bills.”226 And the recent advent of the PIPP, as noted above, will
help many in need. Still, there is much more to be done.
These partial victories for advocates of attention to energy insecurity of vulnerable populations during the pandemic reflect a hard
truth. Policies to ensure that customers at risk did not lose their
vital utility service became critically important during the pandemic as they had to decide whether to pay their utility bills or
allocate funds toward other necessities. Yet the fact that considerable need will still exist in 2022 shows that there are still pervasive
inequities in the current utility regulatory system. These stem
from long-established legal principles that prioritize ratemaking
based on the cost of providing service utility regulation and that as
a result are too “often disconnected from the societal outcomes of
regulatory decisions.”227 However, building on the explicit recognition of the need to address energy insecurity to date, it is still possible that more can eventually be accomplished in Virginia. The
DSS’s forthcoming analysis of gaps to reduce customers’ energy
burden that are not already served by existing and available federal, state, local, or nonprofit programs may serve as a catalyst for
progress, although the recent Republican takeover of the House of
Delegates militates in favor of caution.228
Issues of energy insecurity have featured more prominently
than ever before in Virginia, as numerous actors expressed a willingness to assist those impacted by the pandemic. This is important in another way. Professor Baker has written that energy
justice requires an “explicitly transformative politics that completely upends the features of the energy system that perpetuate
injustice and inequality.”229 When one is attempting to transform
existing political dynamics, countering the interests of deeply entrenched actors whose influence has dominated the system for

226. Has Your Electricity Been Disconnected?, CLEAN VA. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.
cleanvirginia.org/has-your-electricity-been-disconnected/
[https://perma.cc/G8JJ-NLBU]
(website providing information to consumers).
227. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 18.
228. Meagan Flynn, Republicans End Democratic Control of Virginia House of Delegates,
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2021, 4:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-pol
itics/virginia-house/2021/11/02/44bbab6c-36b4-11ec-91dc-551d44733e2d_story.html [https:
//perma.cc/Y76P-PHCR].
229. Baker, supra note 9, at 24.
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decades,230 immediate full success is not to be expected. Yet the
focused attention to the issues in recent years can be a foundation
for subsequent action. From acorns, eventually mighty trees grow.
As Professor Finley-Brook has written about energy justice,
“Grassroots movements deepen and grow where people directly experience injustices and support each other in shared struggle (i.e.,
collective engagement), either in place-based collaboration or
through networks across space.”231 This type of shared experience
is necessary for increased attention to energy justice issues, both
to achieve substantive results and to strengthen the connections
that eventually form powerful and resilient grassroots movements.
The continued coalition building among advocacy groups is an example of how this evolution can work. Poverty law advocates, advocates for utility reform, and environmental groups have worked together productively to promote energy affordability in Virginia.
Developing this sort of infrastructure on the ground is the sort of
effort that can pay off later in further understanding the needs of
energy customers and advancing their concerns in the General Assembly and elsewhere. Awareness of energy justice issues and collaboration by advocacy groups can prompt action by the highest
levels of state government.
The discussion about energy burden has had another salutary
effect: it has shone the spotlight on the substantial political power
of the state’s utilities, and how they have overcharged their ratepayers and been able to get away with it, even in the face of mounting evidence that their customers are suffering during the pandemic. In progress toward energy justice, “oppositional encounters”
of this sort serve an extremely important function: they “publicize
demands for recognition and procedural justice.” 232 That advocates
have not fully succeeded hardly portends failure for the future, as
continued attention to the situation may eventually lead to more
concrete action.
The discussion in this Article focuses largely on one aspect of
energy justice: attention to energy affordability. As a result, any
conclusions to be drawn from the events that have transpired in
the General Assembly and state agencies from the beginning of the
pandemic until now to reshape the state’s utility law and policy do
230.
231.
232.

Wilson, supra note 118.
Finley-Brook et al., supra note 10, at 187.
Id.
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not necessarily translate directly to other efforts to promote energy
justice in Virginia. Yet there is one important lesson to be learned
from recent events that will be relevant throughout the clean energy transition, at which Virginia is now at an inflection point.
With the enactment of the VCEA, numerous clean energy policies
will be designed in the next several years by the SCC and other
actors through multiple rulemaking proceedings and other actions.
How energy justice concerns will be accounted for in these proceedings is yet to be determined, of course. But attention to energy justice during the pandemic shows that policymakers can pay attention to equity during the transition to clean energy. Promoting a
clean energy system and making it more equitable are not mutually exclusive objectives, nor should they be.

